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 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
practice—What are the plans if a lifesaving abortion is
needed? Who will provide it?
Indeed, the stronger moral, and even legal, case for
responsibility—criminal or otherwise—lies with hospital
administrators and hospitals. Health care organizations
are moral communities. The persons who comprise them
are moral agents who share common causes and comple-
mentary roles. Their collective mission is informed by a
unique construction of moral professionalism (Austin
2007; Mickelsen 2013). The core aims of that moral pro-
fessionalism are promoting health, preventing disease,
relieving pain and suffering, forestalling death, curing
disease when possible, and caring for those who cannot
be cured (Cassell 1991). Administrators and organiza-
tional leaders are co-fiduciaries with physicians and
other clinicians for promoting these aims and providing
quality care. They share the “ethical weight” of morally
vexing cases, as well as the responsibility to balance
organizational values, professional norms, the integrity
of clinicians, and duties to patients in developing and
executing strategies to resolve them (Mickelsen 2013).
However they are worded, health care organizational
mission statements generally embrace the clinical norm
of acting in patients’ best interests or “putting the patient
first.” The failure to do so occasions moral distress in
clinicians, undermines institutional integrity, and, most
importantly, harms patients (Mickelsen 2013).
Blanket policies that impose a complete ban on thera-
peutic abortions no matter how early the pregnancy or
how imperiled the woman’s life do just this. Indeed, a
health care institution whose policies force clinicians to
disregard the particular circumstances of individual
cases, including the risk of maternal morbidity and mor-
tality in the setting of therapeutic abortion, fits exactly
the idea of showing “extreme indifference” to the value
of a pregnant woman’s life. It also forces clinicians to
violate accepted standards of practice.
Health care institutions have at least a moral duty to
effect plans to handle emergency cases whether by refer-
rals or the use of other physicians (i.e., outside the
institution), or, if those would not be sufficiently timely,
then by having a willing physician in the institution
carry out the therapeutic abortion. This could entail an
institutional willingness to employ a physician (or physi-
cians) who would be willing to perform an abortion in
emergency circumstances.
While we are wary of escalating the use of the crim-
inal law surrounding pregnant women and fetuses, we
agree with Nelson that, in the absence of prospective poli-
cies to accommodate therapeutic abortion in lifesaving
emergencies, neither individual nor collective institutional
conscience absolves clinicians or health care institutions of
a criminal act that warrants prosecution. 
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Pregnant Women and Equitable Access
to Emergency Medical Care
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A diabetic patient suffering from ketoacidosis was taken
from his hospital bed, removed from the hospital, and
left in the parking lot without shoes or a shirt because
the patient did not have health insurance and had not
paid for prior services (Fedas, Alexander, and Chase-
Lubitz 1991). The patient died at home the following
day. A man with a steak knife in his back, wedged
against his spine, was transferred from an emergency
room because he was uninsured and could not pay
$1,000 cash in advance to remove the knife (Annas 1986).
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A woman who was mistakenly identified as uninsured
was turned away by two hospitals during the early
stages of birth despite indications of fetal distress, and
once she reached a hospital that would provide the
necessary care the fetus had died (Gionis, Camargo, and
Zito 2002). After a pregnant woman’s water broke at 14
weeks, she was denied services at a hospital and sent on
an 80-mile cab ride to receive the procedure her phys-
ician declared medically necessary (Clark 2003). A
woman whose water broke at 18 weeks was sent home
twice from a hospital without receiving treatment or
accurate information on the status of her fetus, denying
her the medical services that would most ensure her
safety (NeJaime and Siegel 2015). The first three cases
represent examples that led to the passing of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), which sought to end patient dumping,
where hospitals would deny service or transfer patients,
typically poor individuals, whom they did not want to
care for. The last two cases were enabled by the govern-
ment through the passage of the conscientious objection
statutes that Nelson (2018) references, which allow pro-
viders, including large for-profit hospital systems, to
deny medically necessary, potentially lifesaving care due
to religious or moral beliefs.
While Nelson (2018) focused on the potential criminal
liability of providers who deny abortions when they are
the standard of care in a lifesaving emergency, this com-
mentary focuses on the role of the government in ena-
bling these actions. With high rates of maternal mortality
that continue to rise (Carroll 2017), it is troubling that
the government is creating a dichotomy that attempts to
minimize the practice of hospitals denying emergency
services to low socioeconomic status patients while delib-
erately encouraging the denial of emergency services to
pregnant women. In doing so, the government goes
beyond the constitutional requirements of free exercise of
religion, instead raising questions of equal protection by
doing little to minimize the risk to pregnant women.
Though the First Amendment generally protects the
free exercise of religion, this right, as with all constitu-
tional rights, is a negative right. It prohibits the govern-
ment from interfering with the practice of one’s religious
beliefs, but does not obligate the government to take
positive actions to ensure that one is able to freely prac-
tice one’s religious beliefs at all times. This concept of
negative rights has already played a significant part in
abortion jurisprudence, when the Supreme Court
declared that while the right to have an abortion is con-
stitutionally protected, the government need not take
positive action to ensure that all women have access
(Harris v. McRae 1980). Yet in this circumstance, the gov-
ernment is taking legislative action to actively reduce
access to potentially lifesaving medical procedures.
These actions contradict the state obligation to protect
individuals equally. This obligation does not cease due
to the beliefs or morals of individuals. Proponents of the
COTA laws that Nelson (2018) references argue that they
do just that. They protect the religious beliefs of pro-
viders while those seeking treatment can access the serv-
ices elsewhere. As the preceding examples show, in an
emergency where a woman’s life is on the line, this is
hardly the case. In fact, the government rarely requires
providers to take steps to minimize the risks of harm to
these women. In contrast, the laws go out of their way to
increase the risk. These accommodation laws often pro-
vide expansive exemptions for any religion or, with the
inclusion of moral objections, no religion at all.
Accommodation laws often go beyond allowing mere
refusals, authorizing providers to withhold information
that would enable women to find needed care, under the
argument that this would make religious providers com-
plicit in the abortion that may eventually occur (NeJaime
and Siegel 2015).
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) pre-
vents the government from substantially burdening a
person’s exercise of religion unless the government has a
compelling interest and is using the least restrictive
means to further that interest (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
2013). Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “in
applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate account of
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries’” (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 2013). Instead,
states have created a two-tier system, where some pro-
viders are obligated to ensure lifesaving, emergency serv-
ices and other providers are enabled to deny services to
pregnant women who may not share their beliefs. For
those women who have access only to religious or reli-
giously affiliated providers, these separate systems can
hardly be considered equal.
Though some may feel this is a relatively minor reduc-
tion in access to ensure protection of religious beliefs, the
continuing trend of health care provider mergers make
this a growing threat to any woman unfortunate enough
to find herself in need of a potentially lifesaving abortion.
Nearly 20% of hospitals, and 8 of the 25 largest health
care systems, are religiously owned, with one in six
patients treated by a Catholic hospital (NeJaime and
Siegel 2015). And they can dominate in specific local mar-
kets. For example, in Lane County, Oregon, the Catholic
health care system provided approximately 70% of the
hospital services (NeJaime and Siegel 2015).
While Catholic hospitals are required to follow the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services, the increase in mergers means restrictions have
expanded to providers that do not necessarily share
those beliefs. For example, the 80-mile cab ride refer-
enced earlier was at a secular hospital that had recently
merged with a Catholic hospital and as part of the con-
tract agreed to adopt the same restrictions in care (Clark
2003). Though the physician stated that an abortion was
medically necessary, the head of the hospital refused to
approve the procedure (Clark 2003).
With the reality of expanding religious affiliations
and the frequent requirement that secular providers
adhere to their belief system, this raises the question of
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why states are not moving to reduce the potential harm
to those in the community, including pregnant women in
emergency circumstances. Moreover, policymakers
should consider the message sent when the state pro-
vides these exemptions with little concern for the impact
on pregnant women. If neither the government nor those
seeking accommodations are interested in minimizing
harms to pregnant women, or third parties in general, it
seems the concern is not with protecting the health and
interests of all parties but instead with enforcing reli-
gious norms on those who do not share those beliefs,
which itself could violate constitutional protections of
religious freedom.
As seen in the opening paragraph’s last two examples
where the women’s water broke extremely early, a medic-
ally necessary abortion in a potentially lifesaving emer-
gency is rarely, if ever, the outcome the woman sought. If
we as a society believe no state should require a physician
to perform an abortion against his or her will, we should
also ensure mechanisms to prevent pregnant women from
being forced to bear the burden of others’ religious con-
victions. If states insist on protecting providers’ religious
objection to abortion, they should also insist on providing
equal protection to the constitutional rights of pregnant
women. Providers should be required to make known to
the public the services they will not offer, even in lifesav-
ing emergencies. Health care providers open to the public
mislead the community into believing they would receive
emergency care if needed, and to then deny these services
when they are most in need should be considered
immoral and unacceptable in a civilized society. Providers
seeking accommodation should be required to assist
patients in a medical emergency to find a provider that
will perform the necessary procedure, including within
their own facility if time or the woman’s condition will
not allow for a transfer. Finally, acquisitions and mergers
that expand provider exemptions to reduce access to con-
stitutionally protected rights and place pregnant women
at risk should be prevented.
While the government may not have a positive duty
to ensure that pregnant women can access their consti-
tutional right to abortion, active steps should not be
taken to eliminate access. EMTALA was passed to
counter the rise of for-profit hospitals refusing to serve
poor patients. Today, religious and moral accommoda-
tions institutionalize efforts of the expanding religiously
affiliated hospital system to deny certain medically
necessary lifesaving procedures to pregnant women,
which likely has a disparate impact on the same low
socioeconomic patients EMTALA sought to help. If mor-
ality is truly the value these laws promote, accommoda-
tion laws must follow EMTALA in seeking to provide
care to pregnant women in their hour of need, rather
than relegating their status to that of second-class citi-
zens (Ulrich 2012). 
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